Kantian Equilibrium

24 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2010

See all articles by John E. Roemer

John E. Roemer

Yale University - Department of Political Science; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Date Written: 2009-05

Abstract

Consider a game whose strategies are "contributions". A strategy profile is a Kantian equilibrium if no player would like all players to alter their contributions by the same multiplicative factor. Kantian equilibria are Pareto efficient. We characterize the allocation rules on several domains of environments that can be implemented as Kantian equilibria. The concept unifies the proportional solution on production economies and the linear cost-share equilibrium on public-good economies. We study Kantian equilibrium in the prisoner's dilemma, in a voting problem, and in a political economy where redistribution is the issue. The Kantian dictum engenders considerable but not unqualified cooperation.

Suggested Citation

Roemer, John E., Kantian Equilibrium (2009-05). Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, Issue 1, pp. 1-24, March 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1550490 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2009.01592.x

John E. Roemer (Contact Author)

Yale University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 208269
New Haven, DC 06520-8269
United States
203-432-5249 (Phone)
203-432-6196 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jer39/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

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