24 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2010
Date Written: 2009-05
Consider a game whose strategies are "contributions". A strategy profile is a Kantian equilibrium if no player would like all players to alter their contributions by the same multiplicative factor. Kantian equilibria are Pareto efficient. We characterize the allocation rules on several domains of environments that can be implemented as Kantian equilibria. The concept unifies the proportional solution on production economies and the linear cost-share equilibrium on public-good economies. We study Kantian equilibrium in the prisoner's dilemma, in a voting problem, and in a political economy where redistribution is the issue. The Kantian dictum engenders considerable but not unqualified cooperation.
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