Who Benefits from Kipp?

29 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2010 Last revised: 6 Jul 2010

See all articles by Joshua D. Angrist

Joshua D. Angrist

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Susan M. Dynarski

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy; University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - School of Education

Thomas J. Kane

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Public Policy & Social Research; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Parag A. Pathak

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

Christopher Walters

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2010

Abstract

Charter schools affiliated with the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) are emblematic of the No Excuses approach to public education. These schools feature a long school day, an extended school year, selective teacher hiring, strict behavior norms and a focus on traditional reading and math skills. We use applicant lotteries to evaluate the impact of KIPP Academy Lynn, a KIPP charter school that is mostly Hispanic and has a high concentration of limited English proficiency (LEP) and special-need students, groups that charter critics have argued are typically under-served. The results show overall gains of 0.35 standard deviations in math and 0.12 standard deviations in reading for each year spent at KIPP Lynn. LEP students, special education students, and those with low baseline scores benefit more from time spent at KIPP than do other students, with reading gains coming almost entirely from the LEP group.

Suggested Citation

Angrist, Joshua and Dynarski, Susan M. and Kane, Thomas J. and Pathak, Parag A. and Walters, Christopher, Who Benefits from Kipp? (February 2010). NBER Working Paper No. w15740. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1550609

Joshua Angrist (Contact Author)

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Susan M. Dynarski

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Thomas J. Kane

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Parag A. Pathak

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Christopher Walters

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

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