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The Ultimatum Game and Expected Utility Maximization - In View of Attachment Theory

31 Pages Posted: 11 Feb 2010 Last revised: 23 Dec 2010

Shaul Almakias

Ministry of Finance, Ruppin College

Avi Weiss

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: May 10, 2009

Abstract

In this paper we import a mainstream psychological theory, known as attachment theory, into economics and show the implications of this theory for economic behavior by individuals in the ultimatum bargaining game. Attachment theory examines the psychological tendency to seek proximity to another person, to feel secure when that person is present, and to feel anxious when that person is absent. An individual's attachment style can be classified along two-dimensional axes, one representing attachment avoidance and one representing attachment anxiety. Avoidant people generally feel discomfort when being close to others, have trouble trusting people and distance themselves from intimate or revealing situations. Anxious people have a fear of abandonment and of not being loved. Utilizing attachment theory, we evaluate the connection between attachment types and economic decision making, and find that in an Ultimatum Game both proposers' and responders' behavior can be explained by their attachment styles, as explained by the theory. We believe this theory has implications for economic behavior in different settings, such as negotiations, in general, and more specifically, may help explain behavior, and perhaps even anomalies, in other experimental settings.

Keywords: Attachment Theory, Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics, Ultimatum Game, Psychology and Economics

JEL Classification: C91, C78

Suggested Citation

Almakias, Shaul and Weiss, Avi, The Ultimatum Game and Expected Utility Maximization - In View of Attachment Theory (May 10, 2009). Bar-Ilan University Department of Economics Research Paper No. 2010-01. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1550743 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1550743

Shaul Almakias

Ministry of Finance, Ruppin College ( email )

No Address Available
09722474949 (Phone)

Avi Weiss (Contact Author)

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+972 3 531 8934 (Phone)
+972 3 535 3180 (Fax)

Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel ( email )

15 Ha'ari Street
Jerusalem
Israel

HOME PAGE: http://taubcenter.org.il/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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