Financial Crisis, Interconnectedness and Regulatory Capital

Lombard Street, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 2010

12 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2010

See all articles by Jorge A. Chan-Lau

Jorge A. Chan-Lau

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - International Capital Markets Department; National University of Singapore (NUS) - Risk Management Institute; Tufts University - Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Date Written: January 18, 2010

Abstract

Among the academic and policymaking communities, the recent financial crisis has prompted calls for adopting higher quality regulatory capital requirements that reflect the systemic risk posed by financial institutions and the risks associated with their market interaction. In line with this debate, this paper proposes a simple conceptual methodology for assessing Too-Connected-to-Fail (TCTF) capital charges. TCTF has been recognized as one of the contributing factors to the systemic risk of a financial institution. One clear benefit of TCTF capital charge is that it induces institutions to internalize the costs associated with their interconnection with other institutions and could provide managerial incentives to avoid too much homogeneity among financial institutions and to reduce the reliance on a limited number of counterparties. The TCTF capital charge could also be useful for defining the perimeter of regulation, as the capital charge needs to rely on the incremental contribution to systemic risk of the institution.

Keywords: Too connected to fail, financial crisis, regulatory capital charges, interconnectedness

JEL Classification: G01, G18, G28, G32

Suggested Citation

Chan-Lau, Jorge Antonio, Financial Crisis, Interconnectedness and Regulatory Capital (January 18, 2010). Lombard Street, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1552043

Jorge Antonio Chan-Lau (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - International Capital Markets Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Risk Management Institute ( email )

21 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Level 4
Singapore, 119613
Singapore

Tufts University - Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy ( email )

160 Packard Ave
Medford, MA 02155
United States

HOME PAGE: http://fletcher.tufts.edu/ceme/index.shtml

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