The Performance and the Effects of Family Control in North African IPOs
31 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2010 Last revised: 7 Aug 2011
Date Written: May 23, 2010
This paper examines the performance effects of family ownership and influence on board structure and its composition in firms that have recently undergone an initial public offering (IPO) in the North African region. Using a unique and comprehensive hand-collected sample of 63 locally listed IPO firm’s from across North Africa we find considerable evidence of a sizeable differential between family and non-family controlled firms. I find considerable evidence supporting increased participation of family members at board level while contrastingly the wider dispersion of family ownership facilitates monitoring and surveillance and mitigates underpricing. Equally in line with the extended network and relationships involved in family firms business angels provide the optimal form of governance in contrast to the more formal private equity and venture capital industry.
Keywords: IPO, Underpricing, Family Firms, North Africa, Agency Theory
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