Litigation and Legal Evolution: Does Procedure Matter?

34 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2010  

Barbara Luppi

Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE) - Faculty of Business and Economics; University of St. Thomas School of Law

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Date Written: February 19, 2010

Abstract

Gordon Tullock’s critique of the common law runs against much of the conventional wisdom in the law and economics literature. In this paper we revisit one of the most controversial aspects of Tullock’s critique. By applying Tullock’s own model of rent-seeking to litigation, we study the effect of alternative procedural rules on civil litigation. Our results provide support for Tullock’s controversial critique of the common law, revealing an evolutionary bias in the production of legal rules by courts. We extend the standard litigation model to study the effects of alternative procedural systems on the evolution of the common law.

Keywords: Efficiency of the Common Law Hypothesis, Gordon Tullock, Rent-Seeking, English Rule, American Rule

JEL Classification: B31, D72, K10, K12, K13, K41

Suggested Citation

Luppi, Barbara and Parisi, Francesco, Litigation and Legal Evolution: Does Procedure Matter? (February 19, 2010). Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-09. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1555784 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1555784

Barbara Luppi

Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE) - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )

Viale Berengario 51
41100 Modena, Modena 41100
Italy

University of St. Thomas School of Law

2115 Summit Avenue
Saint Paul, MN 55105
United States

Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy

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