34 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2010
Date Written: February 19, 2010
Gordon Tullock’s critique of the common law runs against much of the conventional wisdom in the law and economics literature. In this paper we revisit one of the most controversial aspects of Tullock’s critique. By applying Tullock’s own model of rent-seeking to litigation, we study the effect of alternative procedural rules on civil litigation. Our results provide support for Tullock’s controversial critique of the common law, revealing an evolutionary bias in the production of legal rules by courts. We extend the standard litigation model to study the effects of alternative procedural systems on the evolution of the common law.
Keywords: Efficiency of the Common Law Hypothesis, Gordon Tullock, Rent-Seeking, English Rule, American Rule
JEL Classification: B31, D72, K10, K12, K13, K41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Luppi, Barbara and Parisi, Francesco, Litigation and Legal Evolution: Does Procedure Matter? (February 19, 2010). Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-09. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1555784 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1555784