Media Ownership, Concentration and Corruption in Bank Lending

51 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2010 Last revised: 23 May 2013

See all articles by Joel F. Houston

Joel F. Houston

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate

Chen Lin

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics

Yue Ma

City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK) - Department of Economics & Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 1, 2010

Abstract

Building on the pioneering study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006), we examine the effects of media ownership and concentration on corruption in bank lending. Using the unique World Bank dataset covering more than 5,000 firms across 59 countries, we find strong evidence that that state ownership of media is associated with higher levels of bank corruption. We also find that media concentration increases corruption both directly and indirectly through its interaction with media state ownership. In addition, we find that media state ownership and media concentration both accentuate the positive link between official supervisory power and lending corruption and attenuate the negative link between the regulations that empower private monitoring and corruption in lending. Furthermore, the links between media structure and corruption are more pronounced when the borrowing firm is privately owned.

Keywords: bank lending, corruption, media concentration, ownership, bank supervision

JEL Classification: G21, G28, O16

Suggested Citation

Houston, Joel F. and Lin, Chen and Ma, Yue, Media Ownership, Concentration and Corruption in Bank Lending (February 1, 2010). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 100, No. 2, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1556922 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1556922

Joel F. Houston (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate ( email )

P.O. Box 117168
Gainesville, FL 32611
United States

Chen Lin

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )

Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
China

Yue Ma

City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK) - Department of Economics & Finance ( email )

83 Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon
Hong Kong

HOME PAGE: http://www.cb.cityu.edu.hk/staff/yuema24

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