Justifiable Group Choice

23 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 2010

See all articles by Klaus Nehring

Klaus Nehring

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics

Clemens Puppe

Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; University of Karlsruhe

Date Written: December 1, 2009

Abstract

We study the judgment aggregation problem from the perspective of justifying a particular collective decision by a corresponding aggregation on the criteria. In particular, we characterize the logical relations between the decision and the criteria that enable justification of a majority decision through a proposition-wise aggregation rule with no veto power on the criteria. While the well-studied "doctrinal paradox" provides a negative example in which no such justification exists, we show that genuine possibility results emerge if there is a gap between the necessary and the sufficient conditions for the decision. This happens, for instance, if there is only a partial consensus about the appropriate criteria for the decision, if only a subset of these criteria can be elicited, or if the judgment on criteria is based on probabilistic acceptance thresholds.

Keywords: Judgement aggregation, logical aggregation, social choice, majority voting, justifying choice, (non-)truth-functionality

JEL Classification: D7, D71

Suggested Citation

Nehring, Klaus and Puppe, Clemens, Justifiable Group Choice (December 1, 2009). Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1558362 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1558362

Klaus Nehring

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Shields Drive
Davis, CA 95616-8578
United States
916-752-3379 (Phone)
916-752-9382 (Fax)

Clemens Puppe (Contact Author)

Karlsruhe Institute of Technology ( email )

Kaiserstra├če 12
Karlsruhe, Baden W├╝rttemberg 76131
Germany

University of Karlsruhe ( email )

Kaiserstrasse 12
Karlsruhe, 76128
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wior.uni-karlsruhe.de/LS_Puppe/Personal/puppe_home

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