Against Mandatory Disclosure of Economic-Only Positionns Referenced to Shares of Europan Issuers - Twenty Arguments Against the CESR Proposal

24 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2010 Last revised: 4 Jun 2010

See all articles by Dirk A. Zetzsche

Dirk A. Zetzsche

Universite du Luxembourg - Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Center for Business & Corporate Law (CBC)

Date Written: June 6, 2010

Abstract

Following recent developments in some European jurisdictions, the Committee on European Securities Regulators (CESR) proposed “to extend major shareholding notifications to instruments of similar economic effect to holding shares and entitlements to acquire shares” on 9 February 2010. This initiative pushes for mandatory Economic-only Disclosure of Major Shareholdings in Europe (EOD). By providing twenty arguments against the CESR proposal, this paper seeks to spur a lively discussion as to whether mandatory EOD is desirable. It puts forward that European institutions are well-advised to refrain from implementing the CESR proposal in its current form. If at all, implementing a reporting requirement to regulators (Economic-only Reporting, EOR) and limiting EOD to very large positions, serves social welfare better than EOD and avoids major differences between future European securities law and future U.S. securities regulation.

Keywords: Transparency Directive, CfD,Total Return Equity Swaps, Mandatory Disclosure, Notification of Major Shareholdings, Hidden Ownership, Takeover, Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, Gesetz zur Stärkung des Anlegerschutzes und Verbesserung der Funktionsfähigkeit des Kapitalmarkts

JEL Classification: G14, G21, G23, G24, G34, K21, K22, K42

Suggested Citation

Zetzsche, Dirk Andreas, Against Mandatory Disclosure of Economic-Only Positionns Referenced to Shares of Europan Issuers - Twenty Arguments Against the CESR Proposal (June 6, 2010). European Business Organization Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2011, CBC-RPS No. 0049, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1559787

Dirk Andreas Zetzsche (Contact Author)

Universite du Luxembourg - Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance ( email )

Luxembourg, L-1511
Luxembourg

HOME PAGE: http://wwwen.uni.lu/recherche/fdef/research_unit_in_law/equipe/dirk_andreas_zetzsche

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Center for Business & Corporate Law (CBC) ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 1
D-40225 Düsseldorf
Germany
+49 211 81 15084 (Phone)
+49 211 81 11427 (Fax)

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