Public-Private Partnerships Versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering
31 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2010 Last revised: 15 Oct 2012
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Public-Private Partnerships Versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering
Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering
Date Written: October 15, 2012
Abstract
A government agency wants a facility to be built and managed to provide a public service. Two different modes of provision are considered. In a public-private partnership, the tasks of building and managing are bundled, whereas under traditional procurement, these tasks are delegated to separate private contractors. The two provision modes differ in their incentives to innovate and to gather private information about future costs to adapt the service provision to changing circumstances. The government agency's preferred mode of provision depends on the information gathering costs, the costs of innovation efforts, and on the degree to which effort is contractible.
Keywords: Public-Private Partnerships, Integration Versus Separation, Information Gathering, Incomplete Contracts
JEL Classification: D86, L33, H11
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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