Congressional Control Over Defense and Delegation of Authority in the Case of the Defense Emergency Response Fund

Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 105-122, October 2005

Posted: 1 Mar 2010

See all articles by Philip J. Candreva

Philip J. Candreva

U.S. Naval Postgraduate School

L. R. Jones

Naval Postgraduate School

Date Written: October 2005

Abstract

Emerging theories of civil-military relations take a more nuanced look at the role of the actors involved, particularly noting the critical role of the legislature in modern democracies. An important tool of control for the legislature is the power of the purse, so circumstances of delegated spending authority by the legislature to the military are worthy of study. This study investigates a series of supplemental appropriations enacted by the U.S. Congress to pay for the war on terrorism and situates the story in the current literature on civil-military relations. The case describes an episode in which the legislature was willing to delegate authority, how the executive responded, and the circumstances under which the legislature returned to traditional forms of oversight.

Keywords: civil military relations, defense budget, congressional oversight, appropriations

JEL Classification: D73, H56, H61

Suggested Citation

Candreva, Philip J. and Jones, L. R., Congressional Control Over Defense and Delegation of Authority in the Case of the Defense Emergency Response Fund (October 2005). Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 105-122, October 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1561431

Philip J. Candreva (Contact Author)

U.S. Naval Postgraduate School ( email )

1 University Circle
Monterey, CA 93943-5001
United States
831-656-2884 (Phone)

L. R. Jones

Naval Postgraduate School ( email )

1 University Circle
Monterey, CA 93943-5001
United States

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