83 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2010 Last revised: 25 Sep 2013
Date Written: March 1, 2010
Conventional wisdom is that shareholder derivative suits are dead. Yet this death knell is decidedly premature. The current conception of shareholder derivative suits is based on an empirical record limited to suits filed in Delaware or on behalf of Delaware corporations, leaving suits outside this sphere in the shadows of corporate law scholarship. This Article aims to fill this gap by presenting the first empirical examination of shareholder derivative suits in the federal courts. Using an original, hand-collected data set, my study reveals that shareholder derivative suits are far from dead. Shareholders file more shareholder derivative suits than securities class actions, the area of corporate litigation that has received nearly all of the scholarly attention. By writing off shareholder derivative suits, scholars have missed the distinct role that these suits play in corporate law, particularly in the area of corporate governance. Unlike traditional litigation, remarkably few of the suits in my study ended with monetary payments. Instead, these suits more commonly ended with corporations agreeing to reform their own corporate governance practices, from the number of independent directors on their boards to the method by which they compensate their top executives. These settlements reflect the rise of a new type of shareholder activism, one that has gone undocumented in the legal literature. Corporate governance has moved into the courtroom, and this development has important, and potentially troubling, implications for corporate law.
Keywords: corporate law, shareholder derivative suits, shareholders, shareholder activism. litigation, empirical
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Erickson, Jessica, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis (March 1, 2010). William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 5, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1562034