Having a Say and Acting: Assessing the Effectiveness of the European Employment Strategy as an Intra-Governmental Coordinative Instrument

European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 13, Special Issue No. 1, Article 15, 2009

17 Pages Posted: 2 Mar 2010

Date Written: November 18, 2009

Abstract

As the European Union (EU) has strengthened, scholars have emphasized the development of multilevel governance structures and the salience of subnational actors. With the launch of the Open Method of Coordination and the increasing development of non-binding regulations, we must re-consider the potential of this type of governance instrument to serve as an intergovernmental and intra-governmental coordinative mechanism; thus contributing to the development of multilevel governance structures. This paper addresses this issue by focusing on the implementation of the European Employment Strategy and its potential to serve as an intra-governmental coordinative instrument. I argue that this non-binding instrument does informally (de facto) influence intra-governmental relations in member states. In addition, subnational actors have transferred many of these soft principles to lower levels of government. These propositions are explored using data gathered in the EU, Spain, Belgium, and Sweden at both the national and the sub national levels.

Keywords: employment policy; governance; multilevel governance; open coordination; policy coordination; social policy; soft law; Belgium; Spain; Sweden; political science

Suggested Citation

Lopez-Santana, Mariely, Having a Say and Acting: Assessing the Effectiveness of the European Employment Strategy as an Intra-Governmental Coordinative Instrument (November 18, 2009). European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 13, Special Issue No. 1, Article 15, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1562477

Mariely Lopez-Santana (Contact Author)

Schar School of Policy and Government ( email )

Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

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