Rules Transparency and Political Accountability

IGIER Universita Bocconi Working Paper No. 147

37 Pages Posted: 30 Mar 1999

See all articles by Massimo Bordignon

Massimo Bordignon

Universita Cattolica; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Enrico Minelli

University of Brescia - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 1998

Abstract

Allocative and redistributive rules in the public sector are often less contingent on available information than normative theory would suggest. This paper offers a political economy explanation. Under different rules, even if the observable outcomes of policies remain the same, the informational content which can be extracted by these observations is different. Simpler rules are more transparent because they allow citizens to gain more information on politicians. Since there are limits to what voters can observe, this may be a relevant insight into the functioning of the political system.

JEL Classification: H10

Suggested Citation

Bordignon, Massimo and Minelli, Enrico, Rules Transparency and Political Accountability (December 1998). IGIER Universita Bocconi Working Paper No. 147, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=156268 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.156268

Massimo Bordignon (Contact Author)

Universita Cattolica ( email )

20123 Milano
Italy
+39-2-5836-3300/1 (Phone)
+39-2-5836-3302 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Enrico Minelli

University of Brescia - Department of Economics ( email )

Via San Faustino 74B
Brescia, 25122
Italy