Debts, Disasters, and Delinquencies: The Case for a Mandatory Force Majeure Provision in Consumer Credit Agreements, and for a Consumer Credit Insurance Fund

New York University Review of Law and Social Change, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 1-56, 2010

Hofstra Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-03

57 Pages Posted: 6 Mar 2010 Last revised: 28 Apr 2013

See all articles by Norman I. Silber

Norman I. Silber

Hofstra University School of Law; Yale University - Law School

Date Written: March 5, 2010

Abstract

This article addresses inequities in the apportionment of losses which arise when traditional consumer finance rules are applied to enforce consumer payment obligations which accrue during and after catastrophes. Disasters lead inevitably to job losses, to property destruction, and to inhibited access to homes and workplaces. In the wake of devastation, consumer fees and interest charges mount, and payment defaults increase. It is argued here that the resulting individual hardships and social distress could be mitigated by mandating the inclusion of force majeure provisions in consumer finance agreements and by creating a national consumer credit insurance fund.

Keywords: Consumer Movement, Mortgage Lender, Credit Card Issuer, Eviction, Hurricane

JEL Classification: D10, D11, D18, D19, G20, G21, G28, G29, H31, I31

Suggested Citation

Silber, Norman I., Debts, Disasters, and Delinquencies: The Case for a Mandatory Force Majeure Provision in Consumer Credit Agreements, and for a Consumer Credit Insurance Fund (March 5, 2010). New York University Review of Law and Social Change, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 1-56, 2010, Hofstra Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-03, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1565604

Norman I. Silber (Contact Author)

Hofstra University School of Law ( email )

121 Hofstra University
Hempstead, NY 11549
United States
516 463 5866 (Phone)
516 463 4962 (Fax)

Yale University - Law School

P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States

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