'To Codify or Not to Codify the Principles of Criminal Responsibility: A Question of Fundamental Justice and Equality'
TOWARDS A CLEAR AND JUST CRIMINAL LAW: A CRIMINAL REPORTS FORUM, pp. 231-242, Don Stuart, Ron Delisle, Allan Manson, eds., Carswell: Toronto, 1999
12 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2010 Last revised: 24 Nov 2011
Date Written: 1998
Abstract
This critique of a proposed General Part to the Criminal Code (Canada), was prepared for a forum of criminal law academics and jurists organized by members of the Faculty of Law, Queen’s University and held in Kingston Ontario in the Fall 1998. The author argues that: (1) any attempt by Parliament to codify “basic principles under which persons can be justly held criminally responsible” as proposed in the Preamble to the Draft General Part, would be legislative action inherently contrary to the spirit of the constitutional protections for individual and group rights under the principles of fundamental justice and substantive equality as guaranteed in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Legislation so contrary to the vision of constitutional rights as legally paramount and continually evolving in response to changes in social and political consciousness in Canada should not withstand thoughtful and thorough scrutiny by the Supreme Court of Canada in a constitutional reference. Furthermore, codification of such principles: (2) would be an unconstitutional arrogation by Parliament of powers not within its powers or jurisdiction; (3) would have a deleterious impact on the development of principles of criminal responsibility in Canadian law in that it would: (a) impede ongoing development in the interpretation of those principles by the judiciary in the particular and variable context of judicial decisions in specific cases; (b) give inappropriate weight to a particular interpretation of the principles of criminal responsibility and thereby also misleadingly imply that there is fuller agreement in Canada about these matters than actually exists; (c) suppress potentially fruitful dissent about these matters, including dissent and diversity of opinion grounded on diverse social, cultural, and political experience; and finally, (4) is not only premature at present, but for all of the reasons above, is a project that is destined to be perpetually “premature,” if not as long as the rivers flow and the sun rises and sets, then at least as long as Canada continues to adhere to the general constitutional and legal framework it presently enjoys.
In Section 3 the comment critiques treatments proposed in the Draft General Part for omissions, involuntary conduct, causation, reasonableness, mistake of fact, the availability of common law defences, incapacity based on age or mental disorder, self-induced intoxication, self defence, defence of property, duress, and necessity. The conclusion adds a comment on provocation and expresses reservations about the capacity of codification and other “grand exercises in law reform” to deliver a net improvement in the quality of justice generally enjoyed. The author concludes that on-going and sustained analysis of criminal responsibility conducted within a framework of fundamental questions of principle and carried out in the light of contemporary medical, psychological, and social knowledge, promises to be a far more valuable resource for the justice system.
Keywords: criminal responsibility, codification, principles of fundamental justice, substantive criminal law
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