On the Institutional Design of Burden Sharing When Financing External Border Enforcement in the EU

30 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2010

See all articles by Claus Jochen Haake

Claus Jochen Haake

Bielefeld University

Tim Krieger

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics

Steffen Minter

University of Paderborn - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 8, 2010

Abstract

Illegal immigration affects not only EU member states at the Mediterranean Sea but also more Northern states due to open internal borders and onward migration. Northern member states may free-ride on border countries’ enforcement efforts, leading to a sub-optimal level of border control. While neither a centralized nor a coordinated policy appears to be feasible, we show that employing an expected externality mechanism leads to voluntary preference revelation with respect to immigration policy under several (but not all) scenarios. This policy measure requires, however, the EU Commission to take on a very active role as moderator between member states, which at the same time must accept the Commission to play this role.

Keywords: illegal migration, immigration policy, border enforcement, interregional transfers, European Union, expected externality mechanism

JEL Classification: F22, J61, J68

Suggested Citation

Jochen Haake, Claus and Krieger, Tim and Minter, Steffen, On the Institutional Design of Burden Sharing When Financing External Border Enforcement in the EU (March 8, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1567167 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1567167

Claus Jochen Haake

Bielefeld University ( email )

Postfach 10 01 31
Bielefeld, D-33501
Germany

Tim Krieger (Contact Author)

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics ( email )

University of Freiburg
Wilhelmstr. 1b
Freiburg, D-79085
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wguth.uni-freiburg.de

Steffen Minter

University of Paderborn - Department of Economics ( email )

Warburger Str. 100
D-33098 Paderborn
Germany

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