Does Asymmetric Information Affect the Premium in Mergers and Acquisitions?

Abstract

TWe test the influence of information asymmetry on the premium paid for an acquisition. We analyze mergers and acquisitions as English auctions. The theory of dynamic auctions with private and common value predicts that more informed bidders may pay a lower price. We test that prediction with a sample of 1,026 acquisitions in the United States between 1990 and 2007. We assume that blockholders of the target’s shares are better informed than other bidders because they possess privileged information on the target. Our empirical results show that blockholders pay a much lower premium than do other buyers.

Keywords: Asymmetric information, merger and acquisition, blockholder, premium, English auction, test for over-identifying restriction (Sargan test), test for endogeneity (Durbin-Wu-Hausman test)

JEL Classification: C33, D81, G34