Foreign Food Aid Procurement: Why Domestic Preferencing Requirements Must Be Substantially Reduced to More Effectively and Efficiently Alleviate Global Hunger

Public Contract Law Journal, Vol. 39, p. 51, 2009

20 Pages Posted: 12 Mar 2010

See all articles by Derek J. Hanson

Derek J. Hanson

The George Washington University Law School - Student

Date Written: October 1, 2009

Abstract

While the United States does provide the majority of global food aid, it does so very inefficiently and often ineffectively. The United States spends too much of its foreign food aid budget procuring its food and transportation, and often the food aid arrives too late to be entirely effective. Sometimes, an influx of U.S. food aid can even have detrimental effects on local markets, potentially expanding the future need for food aid of recipient countries. The current procurement of food aid for the Title II program, heavily burdened by stringent domestic preferencing requirements, results in increased costs to agencies, aid recipients, and agricultural markets in recipient countries. Congress should eliminate or greatly reduce those domestic preferencing requirements and provide federal agencies greater flexibility to procure food through a combination of local, regional, and domestic procurement to more effectively and efficiently save lives and alleviate global hunger.

Keywords: Food Aid, Hunger, Foreign Aid, Farmers, Domestic Preferences, Procurement, Government Contracts, USAID, Title II, Local Procurement

JEL Classification: F35

Suggested Citation

Hanson, Derek J,, Foreign Food Aid Procurement: Why Domestic Preferencing Requirements Must Be Substantially Reduced to More Effectively and Efficiently Alleviate Global Hunger (October 1, 2009). Public Contract Law Journal, Vol. 39, p. 51, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1568422

Derek J, Hanson (Contact Author)

The George Washington University Law School - Student ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States

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