The Benefits of Costly Voting

20 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2010

See all articles by Surajeet Chakravarty

Surajeet Chakravarty

University of Exeter Business School

Todd R. Kaplan

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics; University of Haifa - Department of Economics

Gareth D. Myles

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 13, 2010

Abstract

We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their preferred outcome of a vote. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be. By having a cost to voting, only those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost. Hence, the outcome will be determined by voters with higher valuations. We show that in such a case welfare may be enhanced. Such an effect occurs when there is both a large enough density of voters with low values and a high enough expected value.

Keywords: costly voting, externalities

JEL Classification: C70, D72

Suggested Citation

Chakravarty, Surajeet and Kaplan, Todd R. and Myles, Gareth D., The Benefits of Costly Voting (March 13, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1570094 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1570094

Surajeet Chakravarty

University of Exeter Business School ( email )

Xfi Building, Rennes Dr.
Exeter, EX4 4JH
United Kingdom

Todd R. Kaplan (Contact Author)

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Streatham Court
Exeter, EX4 4RJ
United Kingdom
+44 13 9226 3237 (Phone)

University of Haifa - Department of Economics

Haifa 31905
Israel

Gareth D. Myles

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Streatham Court
Room 60 Streatham Court
Exeter EX4 4RJ
United Kingdom
(01392) 264487 (Phone)
(01392) 263242 (Fax)

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