The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International Goods and Services Markets

Posted: 1 Apr 1999

See all articles by Alan Sykes

Alan Sykes

Stanford University - Law School

Abstract

With the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and its agreements relating to technical barriers, much attention has been devoted to the possibility of harmonizing international regulatory policies to reduce the impediments to commerce that result from regulatory heterogeneity. This paper argues that, as a normative matter, harmonization is inferior to a legal system that tolerates regulatory differences subject to legal constraints, and that relies on mutual recognition where appropriate (the exception to this claim being matters of technical compatibility between products). Related, as a positive manner, harmonization will often lack any political constituency and thus instances of true harmonization will be rare. To develop these claims, the paper carefully elucidates the unnecessary trade impediments that may result from regulatory heterogeneity, and shows how measures short of harmonization can usually address them adequately.

Suggested Citation

Sykes, Alan, The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International Goods and Services Markets. Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1999. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=157034

Alan Sykes (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

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