GMO Regulations, International Trade and the Imperialism of Standards

LICOS Discussion Paper No. 255/2009

30 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2010

See all articles by Mauro Vigani

Mauro Vigani

University of Gloucestershire

Valentina Raimondi

Università degli Studi di Milano

Alessandro Olper

Università degli Studi di Milano; KU Leuven - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance (LICOS)

Date Written: January 2010

Abstract

This paper deals with the quantification of GMO regulations on bilateral trade flows. A composite index of the ‘complexity’ of such regulations for sixty countries as well as an ‘objective’ score for six GMO regulatory sub-dimensions has been developed. Using a gravity model, we show how bilateral ‘similarity’ in GMO regulations, affect trade flows for the composite index and its components. Results show that bilateral distance in GMO regulations negatively affect trade flows, especially as an effect of labeling policies, approval process and traceability systems. Interesting, the trade reduction effect induced by GMO standards increase by a factor of four when GMO regulations is treated as endogenous to trade flows. This pattern is consistent with an international environment where large importing countries ‘dictate’ the rules of the game to developing countries.

Keywords: GMO standards, Harmonization, Trade Flow, Gravity Model, Endogeneity

JEL Classification: F13, F14, Q13, Q18, Q17

Suggested Citation

Vigani, Mauro and Raimondi, Valentina and Olper, Alessandro, GMO Regulations, International Trade and the Imperialism of Standards (January 2010). LICOS Discussion Paper No. 255/2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1571202 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1571202

Mauro Vigani

University of Gloucestershire ( email )

Oxstalls Lane
The Park
Gloucester GL2 9HW, Gloucestershire GL50 2RH
United Kingdom

Valentina Raimondi

Università degli Studi di Milano ( email )

Via Festa del Perdono, 7
Milan, 20122
Italy

Alessandro Olper (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi di Milano ( email )

Via Celoria, 2
Milano, 20133
Italy
+390250316481 (Phone)
+390250316486 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://users.unimi.it/olper/

KU Leuven - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance (LICOS) ( email )

Waaistraat 6 - box 3511
Leuven, 3000
Belgium

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