57 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2010 Last revised: 14 May 2014
Date Written: January 2, 2013
This paper examines whether conflicted analyst research affects the firms under coverage. We develop a novel approach to identify a sample of firms whose coverage is mostly driven by analysts’ private incentives to generate investment banking revenue. We find that conflicted analyst coverage is recognized by investors and its loss has little adverse effect on information efficiency, capital investment, cost of capital, and equity issuance. Our results suggest that firms attain little benefit when offering investment banking business in exchange for analyst coverage.
Keywords: Conflicts of interest, sell-side research, Global Research Settlement, analyst coverage incentives, loss of analyst coverage, information asymmetry.
JEL Classification: G12, G14, G18, G24
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Jacobsen, Stacey E. and Stefanescu, Irina and Yu, Xiaoyun, The 'Real' Value of Conflicted Analyst Coverage (January 2, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1571418 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1571418
By John Graham