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Public Market Staging: The Timing of Capital Infusions in Newly Public Firms

40 Pages Posted: 24 Mar 2010  

Michael G. Hertzel

Arizona State University (ASU) - Finance Department

Mark R. Huson

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis

Robert Parrino

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance

Date Written: March 15, 2010

Abstract

We examine the financing activities of newly public firms for evidence on the staging of capital infusions. We consider an agency cost framework in which sequential financing increases issue costs, but controls the overinvestment problem that can arise when funds are provided prior to the maturity of an investment option. We find that the time from the IPO to the first post-IPO capital infusion decreases with the ratio of intangible to total assets, R&D intensity, and with investment intensity, measured relative to the amount of capital raised in the IPO. This evidence is similar to that documented by Gompers (1995) for venture capital staging and is consistent with the agency cost framework. Our study adds to the broad literatures that consider alternative explanations for the timing of capital raising activities, cash holdings, and the effectiveness of mechanisms used to control the overinvestment problem.

Keywords: staged investment, IPO, cash

JEL Classification: G30, G35

Suggested Citation

Hertzel, Michael G. and Huson, Mark R. and Parrino, Robert, Public Market Staging: The Timing of Capital Infusions in Newly Public Firms (March 15, 2010). AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1571612 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1571612

Michael G. Hertzel

Arizona State University (ASU) - Finance Department ( email )

W. P. Carey School of Business
P.O. Box 873906
Tempe, AZ 85287-3906
United States
480-965-6869 (Phone)
602-965-8539 (Fax)

Mark R. Huson (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis ( email )

4-20C Business
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada
780-492-2803 (Phone)
780-492-3325 (Fax)

Robert Parrino

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance ( email )

Red McCombs School of Business
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-5788 (Phone)
512-471-5073 (Fax)

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