Bank Risk-Taking, Securitization, Supervision, and Low Interest Rates: Evidence from Lending Standards

57 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2010

See all articles by José-Luis Peydró

José-Luis Peydró

Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

Angela Maddaloni

European Central Bank (ECB)

Date Written: January 15, 2010

Abstract

We analyze the root causes of the current crisis by studying the determinants of bank lending standards in the Euro Area using the answers from the confidential Bank Lending Survey, where national central banks request quarterly information on the lending standards banks apply to customers. We find that low short-term interest rates soften lending standards for both businesses and households and, by exploiting crosscountry variation of Taylor-rule implied rates, that rates too low for too long soften standards even further. The softening is over and above the improvement of borrowers’ creditworthiness and all the relevant lending standards are softened, thus implying that banks’ appetite for (loan) risk increases. In addition, high securitization activity and weak banking supervision standards amplify the positive impact of low short-term interest rates on bank risk-taking, even when we instrument securitization.

Moreover, short-term rates – directly and in conjunction with securitization activity and supervision standards – have a stronger impact on bank risk-taking than long-term interest rates. These results help shed light on the origins of the current crisis and have important policy implications. We obtain similar results using data from the Senior Loan Officer Survey from the United States, which will be incorporated in the next version of the paper.

Keywords: financial crisis, bank risk-taking, bank lending

JEL Classification: E44, E51, G21, G18

Suggested Citation

Peydro, Jose-Luis and Maddaloni, Angela, Bank Risk-Taking, Securitization, Supervision, and Low Interest Rates: Evidence from Lending Standards (January 15, 2010). AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1571697 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1571697

Jose-Luis Peydro

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain
(+34) 93 542 1756 (Phone)
(+34) 93 542 1746 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/joseluispeydroswebpage/

Angela Maddaloni (Contact Author)

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

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