Performance Measurement as a Political Discipline Mechanism

32 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2010 Last revised: 12 Nov 2013

See all articles by Anthony M. Bertelli

Anthony M. Bertelli

Pennsylvania State University; Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals - IBEI

Peter John

University College London - School of Public Policy; Department of Political Economy, KCL

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 9, 2010

Abstract

Governments at one level increasingly develop measures of the activities of policymakers at another. That policymaking behavior as well as the measures can have electoral consequences. A large literature has developed in public administration and policy that assesses the determinants and validity of performance measures and their influence on the strategic behavior of public organizations. While recognizing the progress made by this line of research, we introduce a theoretical framework that accounts for the political context in which performance measures emerge and are implemented. Specifically, we claim that superordinate governments use these kinds of performance measures as a political discipline mechanism (PDM) to incentivize the behavior of subordinate governments. We present a formal model and derive a set of testable implications of interest to researchers on performance management and bureaucratic politics

Keywords: Performance Measures, Distributive Politics, Bureaucratic Control, Public Administration and Management

Suggested Citation

Bertelli, Anthony M. and John, Peter and John, Peter, Performance Measurement as a Political Discipline Mechanism (September 9, 2010). USC CLEO Research Paper No. C10-5, USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 10-5, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1571762 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1571762

Anthony M. Bertelli (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States

HOME PAGE: http://tonybertelli.com

Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals - IBEI ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Peter John

University College London - School of Public Policy ( email )

29/30 Tavistock Square
London, WC1H 9QU
United Kingdom

Department of Political Economy, KCL ( email )

Strand
London, England WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
187
Abstract Views
1,479
Rank
203,612
PlumX Metrics