The Effect of Unemployment Insurance Sanctions on the Transition Rate from Unemployment to Employment

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 96-132/3

44 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 1999

See all articles by Jaap H. Abbring

Jaap H. Abbring

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tinbergen Institute; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Gerard J. van den Berg

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Jan C. van Ours

Tilburg University - Department of Economics; University of Melbourne - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 5, 1998

Abstract

This paper finds that unemployment insurance sanctions substantially raise individual transition rates from unemployment to employment. Sanctions are punitive benefits reductions that are supposed to make recipients comply with certain minimum requirements concerning search behavior. We provide a theoretical analysis and we use a unique administrative data set of individuals who started collecting unemployment insurance in the Netherlands in 1992. We deal with various forms of selectivity involved in the imposition of a sanction. We exploit the timing of events as well as the fact that some respondents experience multiple unemployment spells.

JEL Classification: J65, J64, C41

Suggested Citation

Abbring, Jaap H. and van den Berg, Gerard J. and van Ours, Jan C., The Effect of Unemployment Insurance Sanctions on the Transition Rate from Unemployment to Employment (March 5, 1998). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 96-132/3. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=157200 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.157200

Jaap H. Abbring (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://center.uvt.nl/staff/abbring/

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://center.uvt.nl/staff/abbring/

Tinbergen Institute

Roetersstraat 31
Amsterdam, 1018WB
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.tinbergen.nl

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Gerard J. Van den Berg

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 444 6132 (Phone)
+32 20 444 6020 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Tinbergen Institute

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Jan C. Van Ours

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2880 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

University of Melbourne - Department of Economics ( email )

Melbourne, 3010
Australia

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
385
Abstract Views
2,631
rank
70,363
PlumX Metrics