TARP Announcement, Bank Health, and Borrowers' Credit Risk

35 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2010 Last revised: 11 Dec 2015

See all articles by Wei-Ling Song

Wei-Ling Song

Louisiana State University

Cihan Uzmanoglu

Binghamton University, The State University of New York

Date Written: December 1, 2015


Theory suggests that unhealthy banks exhibit more pronounced flight-to-quality behavior during financial crises and, hence, the infusion of capital through unhealthy banks is less effective in relieving the liquidity shocks of vulnerable borrowers. We test these predictions by investigating how the financial health of leading U.S. banks influenced their borrowers’ credit risk surrounding the announcement of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Changes in borrower credit risk, measured by credit default swap (CDS) spreads, should reflect the expected relief from liquidity shocks and other benefits of rescuing banks, such as maintaining the existing lending relationships. Consistent with the theory, prior to the TARP capital infusions, unhealthy banks’ borrowers with high leverage experienced a greater increase in their credit risk relative to similar healthy banks’ borrowers. Following the event, the CDS market anticipated less liquidity relief to these vulnerable unhealthy banks’ borrowers, but more liquidity relief to the vulnerable healthy banks’ borrowers.

Keywords: Financial crisis, Government bailouts, Banking relationship, Systemic risk, Liquidity provision, Credit default swap, Credit risk

JEL Classification: G20, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Song, Wei-Ling and Uzmanoglu, Cihan, TARP Announcement, Bank Health, and Borrowers' Credit Risk (December 1, 2015). Journal of Financial Stability, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1572743 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1572743

Wei-Ling Song (Contact Author)

Louisiana State University ( email )

Baton Rouge, LA 70803
United States
225-578-6258 (Phone)
225-578-6366 (Fax)

Cihan Uzmanoglu

Binghamton University, The State University of New York ( email )

Binghamton, NY 13902-6001
United States
607 777 66 38 (Phone)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics