Real Option Financing Under Asymmetric Information

33 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2010

See all articles by Matthieu Bouvard

Matthieu Bouvard

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE); Toulouse School of Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 12, 2010

Abstract

I study the impact of capital market imperfections on the exercise of a real option. An entrepreneur has private information about a venture for which she seeks outside funding. An initial investment gives access to a continuous flow of information about the project. The duration of that experimentation phase is used to signal quality and investment may be delayed relative to the first best. Investors use milestone contracts, and the entrepreneur is granted stock options with a vesting period or receives a compensation in case of failure. The pay-performance sensitivity of her compensation is correlated with risk taking. The initial mix of inside and outside financing effects the timing of future investment, in line with empirical evidence.

Keywords: Real Options, Innovation, Financial Contracts

JEL Classification: G32, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Bouvard, Matthieu, Real Option Financing Under Asymmetric Information (March 12, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1572800 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1572800

Matthieu Bouvard (Contact Author)

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

Toulouse School of Management ( email )

2, rue du Doyen Gabriel Marty
Toulouse, 31042
France

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