Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1572994
 
 

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Competition for Managers and Corporate Governance


Viral V. Acharya


New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

Marc Gabarro


Erasmus University

Paolo F. Volpin


City University London - Faculty of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

October 1, 2016

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 399/2014
AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
Separation between CEO and Chairman of the Board is typically viewed as evidence of good corporate governance. Surprisingly, the literature has failed so far to uncover any significant relation between CEO/Chairman duality and firm performance. By distinguishing between periods with and without CEO turnover, we empirically identify two o setting effects: the correlation between duality and performance is positive around CEO turnover and negative otherwise. This suggests that the competition for managerial talent forces firms to combine CEO and Chairman in order to attract more skilled CEOs at the cost of reducing governance standards.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 55

Keywords: corporate governance, executive compensation, separate CEO and Chairman.

JEL Classification: G3


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Date posted: March 19, 2010 ; Last revised: November 15, 2016

Suggested Citation

Acharya, Viral V. and Gabarro, Marc and Volpin, Paolo F., Competition for Managers and Corporate Governance (October 1, 2016). European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 399/2014; AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1572994 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1572994

Contact Information

Viral V. Acharya
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY NY 10012
United States
HOME PAGE: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya/public_html/~vacharya.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance
Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
Marc Gabarro (Contact Author)
Erasmus University ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands
Paolo F. Volpin
City University London - Faculty of Finance ( email )
London, EC2Y 8HB
Great Britain
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN


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