Competition for Managers and Corporate Governance

61 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2010 Last revised: 26 Nov 2018

See all articles by Viral V. Acharya

Viral V. Acharya

Professor; New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Marc Gabarro

University of Mannheim

Paolo F. Volpin

Drexel University - Bennett S. LeBow College of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); City University London - Faculty of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 1, 2016

Abstract

Separation between CEO and Chairman of the Board is typically viewed as evidence of good corporate governance. Surprisingly, the literature has failed so far to uncover any significant relation between CEO/Chairman duality and firm performance. By distinguishing between periods with and without CEO turnover, we empirically identify two offsetting effects: the correlation between duality and performance is positive around CEO turnover and negative otherwise. This suggests that the competition for managerial talent forces firms to combine CEO and Chairman in order to attract more skilled CEOs at the cost of reducing governance standards.

Keywords: corporate governance, executive compensation, separate CEO and Chairman.

JEL Classification: G3

Suggested Citation

Acharya, Viral V. and Acharya, Viral V. and Gabarro, Marc and Volpin, Paolo F., Competition for Managers and Corporate Governance (October 1, 2016). European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 399/2014, AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1572994 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1572994

Viral V. Acharya

Professor ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States
2129980354 (Phone)
2129954256 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~vacharya

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States
2129980354 (Phone)
2129954256 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~vacharya

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Marc Gabarro (Contact Author)

University of Mannheim ( email )

Mannheim, 68131
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://finance.uni-mannheim.de/home

Paolo F. Volpin

Drexel University - Bennett S. LeBow College of Business ( email )

101 N. 33rd St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

City University London - Faculty of Finance ( email )

London, EC2Y 8HB
Great Britain

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