44 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2010 Last revised: 2 Aug 2012
Date Written: July 2012
We develop a theoretical model to analyse the eect of competition on the conflict of interest arising from the issuer pay compensation model of the credit rating industry. We nd that relative to monopoly, rating agencies are more likely to inflate ratings under competition, resulting in lower expected welfare. These results do not depend on the presence of ratings shopping as in Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) and Skreta and Veldkamp (2009), but instead focus on the trade-off between maintaining reputation (to increase profits in the future) and in ating ratings today (to increase current profits). Our results suggest that ongoing regulatory initiatives aimed at increasing competition in the ratings industry may reduce overall welfare, unless new entrants have a higher reputation via-a-vis incumbents.
Keywords: Rating agencies, competition, reputation, repeated games, financial regulation
JEL Classification: C73, D43, D82, D83, G24
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Camanho, Nelson and Deb, Pragyan and Liu, Zijun, Credit Rating and Competition (July 2012). 22nd Australasian Finance and Banking Conference 2009; AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1573035 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1573035