The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection: Sweden 1887

31 Pages Posted: 24 Mar 2010

See all articles by Sibylle Lehmann

Sibylle Lehmann

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; Trinity College (Dublin) - Institute for International Integration Studies (IIIS)

Oliver Volckart

Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics

Date Written: March 2010

Abstract

We analyse the Swedish general elections that took place in spring and autumn 1887. Our aim is to discover which groups of voters were responsible for the severe losses that the supporters of free trade suffered in the second of these contests, and that allowed the protectionists to gain the majority in parliament and to initiate a new tariff policy. We find that while capital owners and wage earners consistently favoured free trade, in the spring election only the largest farmers supported protectionism. By autumn, political preferences among smallholders and middling farmers had shifted in favour of protectionism, too. As these groups were not specialised in the production of import competing goods, we assume that the political landslide in the autumn elections can be attributed to the influence of anti-free trade propaganda.

Keywords: voting, election analysis, tariffs, trade policies

JEL Classification: N43, N53, N73

Suggested Citation

Lehmann, Sibylle and Volckart, Oliver, The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection: Sweden 1887 (March 2010). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2010/08. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1573494 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1573494

Sibylle Lehmann (Contact Author)

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Trinity College (Dublin) - Institute for International Integration Studies (IIIS) ( email )

The Sutherland Centre, Level 6, Arts Building
Trinity College
Dublin 2
Ireland

Oliver Volckart

Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics ( email )

Spandauer Str. 1
Berlin, D-10099
Germany

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