Economizing in a Context of Strategizing: Governance Mode Choice in Cournot Competition

Posted: 18 Nov 1999

See all articles by Jackson A. Nickerson

Jackson A. Nickerson

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School

Richard Vanden Bergh

University of Vermont - School of Business Administration

Abstract

This paper builds on Riordan and Williamson (1985) by exploring the economizing choice of organizational form by firms competing in a homogeneous-good market. The paper investigates rivalrous firms' investment and organization choice in a Cournot competition. The model suggests that both governance cost and strategic interactions can influence which asset-organization pair each firm chooses. Application of the model is illustrated with a discussion of the cola wars and the organization of the fountain channel.

JEL Classification: D21, D23, L22

Suggested Citation

Nickerson, Jackson A. and Vanden Bergh, Richard, Economizing in a Context of Strategizing: Governance Mode Choice in Cournot Competition. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1999. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=157355

Jackson A. Nickerson (Contact Author)

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States
314-935-6366 (Phone)
314-935-6359 (Fax)

Richard Vanden Bergh

University of Vermont - School of Business Administration ( email )

Burlington, VT 05405
United States
8026568720 (Phone)

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