The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation

European Banking Center Discussion Paper No. 2010-05S

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2010-29S

51 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2010

See all articles by Rafael Repullo

Rafael Repullo

Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Javier Suarez

Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 31, 2009

Abstract

We assess the procyclical effects of bank capital regulation in a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period. Banks anticipate that shocks to their earnings as well as the cyclical position of the economy can impair their capacity to lend in the future and, as a precaution, hold capital buffers. We find that under cyclically-varying risk-based capital requirements (e.g. Basel II) banks hold larger buffers in expansions than in recessions. Yet, these buffers are insufficient to prevent a significant contraction in the supply of credit at the arrival of a recession. We show that cyclical adjustments in the confidence level underlying Basel II can reduce its procyclical effects on the supply of credit without compromising banks’ long-run solvency targets.

Keywords: Banking regulation, Basel II, Business cycles, Capital requirements, Credit crunch, Loan defaults, Relationship banking

JEL Classification: G21, G28, E44

Suggested Citation

Repullo, Rafael and Suarez, Javier, The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation (October 31, 2009). European Banking Center Discussion Paper No. 2010-05S, CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2010-29S, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1573672 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1573672

Rafael Repullo (Contact Author)

Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI) ( email )

Casado del Alisal 5
28014 Madrid
Spain
+34 91429 0551 (Phone)
+34 91429 1056 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cemfi.es/~repullo/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Javier Suarez

Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI) ( email )

Casado del Alisal 5
28014 Madrid
Spain
+34 91 429 0551 (Phone)
+34 91 429 1056 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

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