Download This PaperReserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment
19 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2010
Date Written: December 24, 2009
Abstract
We present the results of a large field experiment on setting reserve prices in auctions for online advertisements, guided by the theory of optimal auction design suitably adapted to the sponsored search setting. Consistent with the theory, following the introduction of new reserve prices revenues in these auctions have increased substantially.
Keywords: auctions
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Michael Ostrovsky (Contact Author)
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-724-7280 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/ostrovsky/
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
Position Auctions with Consumer Search
By Susan Athey and Glenn Ellison
-
Paid Placement: Advertising and Search on the Internet
By Yongmin Chen and Chuan He
-
An Empirical Analysis of Search Engine Advertising: Sponsored Search in Electronic Markets
By Anindya Ghose and Sha Yang
-
By Sha Yang and Anindya Ghose
-
From Generic to Branded: A Model of Spillover Dynamics in Paid Search Advertising
-
By Juan Feng, Hemant K. Bhargava, ...
-
Search Engine Advertising: Channel Substitution when Pricing Ads to Context
By Avi Goldfarb and Catherine E. Tucker
-
A Dynamic Model of Sponsored Search Advertising
By Song Yao and Carl F. Mela