Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment

19 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2010

See all articles by Michael Ostrovsky

Michael Ostrovsky

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Michael Schwarz

Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: December 24, 2009

Abstract

We present the results of a large field experiment on setting reserve prices in auctions for online advertisements, guided by the theory of optimal auction design suitably adapted to the sponsored search setting. Consistent with the theory, following the introduction of new reserve prices revenues in these auctions have increased substantially.

Keywords: auctions

Suggested Citation

Ostrovsky, Michael and Schwarz, Michael, Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment (December 24, 2009). Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 2054, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1573947 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1573947

Michael Ostrovsky (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-724-7280 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/ostrovsky/

Michael Schwarz

Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs ( email )

Sunnyvale, CA 94089

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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