How Does Voice Matter? Evidence from the Ultimatum Game

24 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2010 Last revised: 16 Oct 2011

See all articles by Qiyan Ong

Qiyan Ong

Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - Division of Economics

Yohanes E. Riyanto

Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - Division of Economics

Steven M. Sheffrin

Tulane University

Date Written: October 9, 2011

Abstract

Prior research has demonstrated that the ability to express one’s views or “voice” matters in social and economic interactions, but little is known of the mechanisms through which voice operates. Using an experimental approach based on the ultimatum game with the strategy method, we explore four potential channels for voice that encompass and expand on prior work: the knowledge effect of voice, the value expressive (or inherent value) of voice, the expectation effect of voice, and the procedural fairness effects of voice. Our results show strong effects through the value expressive and expectation channel, but not through either the knowledge channel or procedural fairness. In our view, voice is powerful because people like to express their views and they are disappointed when their views did not make a difference in their outcomes.

Keywords: voice, ultimatum game

JEL Classification: D30, C91

Suggested Citation

Ong, Qiyan and Riyanto, Yohanes E. and Sheffrin, Steven M., How Does Voice Matter? Evidence from the Ultimatum Game (October 9, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1573979 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1573979

Qiyan Ong (Contact Author)

Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - Division of Economics ( email )

HSS 04-53, 14 Nanyang Drive
Singapore, 639798
Singapore

Yohanes E. Riyanto

Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - Division of Economics ( email )

HSS 04-53, 14 Nanyang Drive
Singapore, 639798
Singapore

Steven M. Sheffrin

Tulane University ( email )

New Orleans, LA 70118
United States

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