Distribution of Power within the IMF: When Does Preference Mean Voice?

15 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2010

See all articles by Fuad T. Aleskerov

Fuad T. Aleskerov

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Valery Kalyagin

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Kirill Pogorelskiy

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

Using the preference-based approach to power analysis of the International Monetary Fund from Aleskerov, Kalyagin & Pogorelskiy (2008), which allows for estimating the power of the IMF members within the Executive Board and the Fund in general through the existing constituency system, we explore a new model of members’ preferences to coalesce. The preferences in this model are based on the data on countries’ bilateral trade. The present results of voting power analysis (as of May 2009) are compared with those produced by the classical power indices by Banzhaf and Penrose. We show that the greater the majority voting rule, the more the preferences to coalesce matter for countries with a small number of votes.

Suggested Citation

Aleskerov, Fuad T. and Kalyagin, Valery and Pogorelskiy, Kirill, Distribution of Power within the IMF: When Does Preference Mean Voice? (2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1574775 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1574775

Fuad T. Aleskerov (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

20 Myasnitskaya Ulitsa
Moscow, 101000
Russia

Valery Kalyagin

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Kirill Pogorelskiy

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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