Distribution of Power within the IMF: When Does Preference Mean Voice?
15 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2010
Date Written: 2010
Using the preference-based approach to power analysis of the International Monetary Fund from Aleskerov, Kalyagin & Pogorelskiy (2008), which allows for estimating the power of the IMF members within the Executive Board and the Fund in general through the existing constituency system, we explore a new model of members’ preferences to coalesce. The preferences in this model are based on the data on countries’ bilateral trade. The present results of voting power analysis (as of May 2009) are compared with those produced by the classical power indices by Banzhaf and Penrose. We show that the greater the majority voting rule, the more the preferences to coalesce matter for countries with a small number of votes.
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