Power and Preferences: An Experimental Approach
32 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2010
Date Written: December 10, 2009
The paper uses an experimental approach to study the voting power distribution in the context of classical model, as well as in generalized form which takes into account players’ preferences to coalesce with each other. Our results extend those of Montero, Sefton & Zhang (2008), confirming their basic findings using independent experimental data, and explain some of their empirical paradoxes. A major result of our experiment is that even small modifications of preferences lead to statistically significant differences in players' shares, justifying the use ofgeneralized power indices over classical ones. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the interplay of preferences significantly affects the process of bargaining and the resulting coalitions.
Keywords: voting power, preferences, experiments, Banzhaf index, symbolic value
JEL Classification: C71, C92, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation