Power and Preferences: An Experimental Approach

32 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2010

See all articles by Fuad T. Aleskerov

Fuad T. Aleskerov

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Alexis Belianin

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Kirill Pogorelskiy

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: December 10, 2009

Abstract

The paper uses an experimental approach to study the voting power distribution in the context of classical model, as well as in generalized form which takes into account players’ preferences to coalesce with each other. Our results extend those of Montero, Sefton & Zhang (2008), confirming their basic findings using independent experimental data, and explain some of their empirical paradoxes. A major result of our experiment is that even small modifications of preferences lead to statistically significant differences in players' shares, justifying the use ofgeneralized power indices over classical ones. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the interplay of preferences significantly affects the process of bargaining and the resulting coalitions.

Keywords: voting power, preferences, experiments, Banzhaf index, symbolic value

JEL Classification: C71, C92, D72

Suggested Citation

Aleskerov, Fuad T. and Belianin, Alexis and Pogorelskiy, Kirill, Power and Preferences: An Experimental Approach (December 10, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1574777 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1574777

Fuad T. Aleskerov (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

20 Myasnitskaya Ulitsa
Moscow, 101000
Russia

Alexis Belianin

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Kirill Pogorelskiy

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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