Presidential Values in Parliamentary Democracies
8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 207 (2010)
30 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2010 Last revised: 15 Sep 2017
Date Written: March 23, 2010
Constitutional theory has long regarded the separation of powers as unique to presidential systems and incompatible with parliamentary ones. In this Article, I suggest that the core values of the separation of powers are achievable in both presidential and parliamentary systems, contrary to the conventional wisdom which insists that the separation of powers is the exclusive province of presidentialism. This conclusion – that parliamentary and presidential systems are comparably receptive to the practical and philosophical strictures of the separation of powers – unlocks interesting possibilities for rethinking constitutional structure anew.
Keywords: Constitutional Theory, Constitutional Design, Separation of Powers, Parliamentarism, Presidentialism, Comparative Constitutional Structure
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