Not All Rivals Look Alike: Estimating an Equilibrium Model of the Release Date Timing Game

22 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2010

See all articles by Liran Einav

Liran Einav

Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Abstract

I develop a new empirical model for discrete games and apply it to study the release date timing game played by distributors of movies. The results suggest that release dates of movies are too clustered around big holiday weekends and that box office revenues would increase if distributors shifted some holiday releases by one or two weeks. The proposed game structure could be applied more broadly to situations where competition is on dimensions other than price. It relies on sequential moves with asymmetric information, making the model particularly attractive for studying (common) situations where player asymmetries are important.

JEL Classification: C13, C51, L13, L15, L82

Suggested Citation

Einav, Liran, Not All Rivals Look Alike: Estimating an Equilibrium Model of the Release Date Timing Game. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 48, Issue 2, pp. 369-390, April 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1578524 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00239.x

Liran Einav (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
650-723-3704 (Phone)
928-223-4973 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
2
Abstract Views
352
PlumX Metrics