Explaining Coordination Networks in Collaborative Partnerships

37 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2010 Last revised: 1 Apr 2010

See all articles by John Calanni

John Calanni

University of Colorado at Denver - School of Public Affairs

William D. Leach

Sol Price School of Public Policy, University of Southern California

Chris Weible

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: March 24, 2010

Abstract

The move towards collaborative governance in the environmental policy arena often takes the form of collaborative partnerships involving multiple stakeholders with divergent beliefs and interests. Within such partnerships, subsets of stakeholders frequently form coalitions for the purpose of achieving a common goal. Often, stakeholders will coordinate with one another both within and across these coalitions. Using interview and questionnaire data from 9 U.S. marine aquaculture partnerships in 2009, we test three competing theoretical propositions regarding how individuals within collaborative partnerships decide with whom to coordinate. These competing propositions include belief homophily (individuals will coordinate with those that hold congruent beliefs), trust (individuals will coordinate with those whom they trust), and resources (individuals will coordinate with those who are seen to hold critical and needed resources). Results suggest that specific trust and resource attributes are more important than shared beliefs when individuals decide to coordinate with others in collaborative partnerships.

Keywords: collaboration, coordination networks, ideology, homophily, trust, resources, Advocacy Coalition Framework, Resource Dependence Theory, Social Capital, marine aquaculture

Suggested Citation

Calanni, John and Leach, William D. and Weible, Chris, Explaining Coordination Networks in Collaborative Partnerships (March 24, 2010). Western Political Science Association 2010 Annual Meeting Paper , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1580361

John Calanni (Contact Author)

University of Colorado at Denver - School of Public Affairs ( email )

1380 Lawrence Street
Suite 500
Denver, CO 80204
United States

William D. Leach

Sol Price School of Public Policy, University of Southern California ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90089-0626
United States

Chris Weible

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

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