Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game

7 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2010

See all articles by Joseph Fuller

Joseph Fuller

The Monitor Company

Michael C. Jensen

Harvard Business School; SSRN; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Harvard University - Accounting & Control Unit

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Abstract

CEOs and CFOs put themselves in a bind by providing earnings guidance and then making decisions designed to meet Wall Street’s expectations for quarterly earnings. When earnings appear to be coming in short of projections, top managers often react by suggesting or demanding that middle and lower level managers redo their forecasts, plans, and budgets. In some cases, top executives simply acquiesce to increasingly unrealistic analyst forecasts and adopt them as the basis for setting organizational goals and developing internal budgets. But in cases where external expectations are impossible to meet, either approach sets up the firm and its managers for failure.

Using the experiences of several companies, the authors illustrate the dangers of conforming to market pressures for unrealistic growth targets. They argue that an overvalued stock, by encouraging overpriced acquisitions and other risky, value-destroying bets, can be as damaging to the long-run health of a company as an undervalued stock.

Putting an end to the “earnings game” requires that CEOs reclaim the initiative by avoiding earnings guidance and managing expectations in such a way that their stocks trade reasonably close to their intrinsic value. In place of earnings forecasts, management should provide information about the company’s strategic goals and main value drivers. They should also talk about the risks associated with the strategies, and management’s plans to deal with them.

Suggested Citation

Fuller, Joseph and Jensen, Michael C., Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 22, Issue 1, pp. 59-63, Winter 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1581815 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2010.00261.x

Joseph Fuller (Contact Author)

The Monitor Company ( email )

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Michael C. Jensen

Harvard Business School ( email )

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Negotiations, Organizations & Markets
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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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Harvard University - Accounting & Control Unit ( email )

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United States

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