Behavioral Antitrust

Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 86, 2010

University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 106

60 Pages Posted: 2 Apr 2010 Last revised: 28 Jun 2011

See all articles by Amanda P. Reeves

Amanda P. Reeves

Latham & Watkins LLP

Maurice E. Stucke

University of Tennessee College of Law; The Konkurrenz Group

Date Written: March 31, 2010


Competition policy is entering a new age. Interest in competition laws has increased world-wide, and the United States no longer holds a monopoly on antitrust policy. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the question for competition authorities is whether and to what extent does bounded rationality, self-interest and willpower matter. This article explores how the behavioral economics literature will advance competition policy. With increasing interest in the United States and abroad in the implications of behavioral economics for competition policy, this Article first provides an overview of behavioral economics. It next discusses how the assumption of rational, self-interested profit maximizers became so embedded in competition policy. The Article then discusses to what extent the behavioral economics literature can inform antitrust policies, and provides several recommendations related to the practical application of behavioral economics to competition policy going forward.

Keywords: Antitrust, Behavioral Economics, Competition Policy, Sherman Act, Monopolization, Cartels

JEL Classification: K21, L40, L41, L42, L44

Suggested Citation

Reeves, Amanda P. and Stucke, Maurice E., Behavioral Antitrust (March 31, 2010). Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 86, 2010; University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 106. Available at SSRN:

Amanda P. Reeves

Latham & Watkins LLP ( email )

555 - 11th Street, N.W.
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20004-1304
United States


Maurice E. Stucke (Contact Author)

University of Tennessee College of Law ( email )

1505 W. Cumberland Ave.
Knoxville, TN 37996
United States
865-974-9816 (Phone)


The Konkurrenz Group ( email )

5335 Wisconsin Ave., NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States

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