Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1582971
 
 

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Voters, Dictators, and Peons: Expressive Voting and Pivotality


Emir Kamenica


University of Chicago

Louisa Egan


Bryn Mawr College; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

May 1, 2010

Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 10-14

Abstract:     
Why do the poor vote against redistribution? We experimentally examine one explanation, namely that individuals gain direct expressive utility from voting in accordance with their ideology and understand they are unlikely to be pivotal; hence, their expressive utility, even if arbitrarily small, entirely determines their voting behavior. In contrast with a basic prediction of this explanation, we find that the probability of being pivotal does not affect the impact of monetary interest on whether a subject votes for redistribution.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: redistribution, ideology, expressive voting


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Date posted: April 1, 2010 ; Last revised: June 3, 2014

Suggested Citation

Kamenica, Emir and Egan, Louisa, Voters, Dictators, and Peons: Expressive Voting and Pivotality (May 1, 2010). Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 10-14. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1582971 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1582971

Contact Information

Emir Kamenica (Contact Author)
University of Chicago ( email )
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
Louisa Egan
Bryn Mawr College ( email )
Bryn Mawr, PA 19010
United States
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
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