Public Safety Through Private Action: An Economic Assessment of Bids, Locks, and Citizen Cooperation

52 Pages Posted: 12 Apr 2010 Last revised: 5 Sep 2010

See all articles by Philip J. Cook

Philip J. Cook

Duke University - Sanford School of Public Policy; Duke University, Dept. of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

John MacDonald

University of Pennsylvania

Date Written: April 2010

Abstract

Given the central role of private individuals and firms in determining the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, and the quality and availability of criminal opportunities, private actions arguably deserve a central role in the analysis of crime and crime prevention policy. But the leading scholarly commentaries on the crime drop during the 1990s have largely ignored the role of the private sector, as have policymakers. Among the potentially relevant trends: growing reporting rates (documented in this paper); the growing sophistication and use of alarms, monitoring equipment and locks; the considerable increase in the employment of private security guards; and the decline in the use of cash. Private actions of this sort have the potential to both reduce crime rates and reduce arrests and imprisonment. Well-designed regulations and programs can encourage effective private action.One creative method to harness private action to cost-effective crime control is the creation of business improvement districts (BIDs). Our quasi-experimental analysis of Los Angeles BIDs demonstrates that the social benefits of BID expenditures on security are a large multiple (about 20) of the private expenditures. Creation and operation of effective BIDs requires a legal infrastructure that helps neighborhoods solve the collective action problem.

Suggested Citation

Cook, Philip J. and MacDonald, John, Public Safety Through Private Action: An Economic Assessment of Bids, Locks, and Citizen Cooperation (April 2010). NBER Working Paper No. w15877, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1586685

Philip J. Cook (Contact Author)

Duke University - Sanford School of Public Policy ( email )

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John MacDonald

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.crim.upenn.edu/faculty_macdonald.htm

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