Net Neutrality Regulation: The Economic Evidence

32 Pages Posted: 10 Apr 2010 Last revised: 21 Apr 2013

Jerry Brito

George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Martin E. Cave

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School; Brunel University London

Robert W. Crandall

Brookings Institution; AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies

Larry F. Darby

The American Consumer Institute

Everett Ehrlich

ESC Company

Jeffrey A. Eisenach

American Enterprise Institute; NERA Economic Consulting

Jerry Ellig

George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Henry Ergas

University of Wollongong - SMART Infrastructure Facility; Deloitte Access Economics

David J. Farber

Carnegie Mellon University - School of Computer Science

Gerald R. Faulhaber

University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School

Robert W. Hahn

University of Oxford, Smith School; Georgetown University

Alfred E. Kahn

National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) (Deceased)

Wayne A. Leighton

Francisco Marroquin University

Robert E. Litan

Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation; AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies

Glen O. Robinson

University of Virginia School of Law

Hal J. Singer

Economists Incorporated

Vernon L. Smith

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; Chapman University School of Law

William E. Taylor III

Marsh & McLennan Companies - Cambridge Office

Timothy J. Tardiff

Advanced Analytical Consulting Group

Leonard Waverman

London Business School

Dennis Weisman

Kansas State University - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 12, 2010

Abstract

In the authors' shared opinion, the economic evidence does not support the regulations proposed in the Commission’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Preserving the Open Internet and Broadband Industry Practices (the “NPRM”). To the contrary, the economic evidence provides no support for the existence of market failure sufficient to warrant ex ante regulation of the type proposed by the Commission, and strongly suggests that the regulations, if adopted, would reduce consumer welfare in both the short and long run. To the extent the types of conduct addressed in the NPRM may, in isolated circumstances, have the potential to harm competition or consumers, the Commission and other regulatory bodies have the ability to deter or prohibit such conduct on a case-by-case basis, through the application of existing doctrines and procedures. Hence, the approach advocated in the NPRM is not necessary to achieve whatever economic benefits may be associated with prohibiting harmful discrimination on the Internet.

Keywords: net neutrality, FCC, Internet, broadband, regulation

Suggested Citation

Brito, Jerry and Cave, Martin E. and Crandall, Robert W. and Darby, Larry F. and Ehrlich, Everett and Eisenach, Jeffrey A. and Ellig, Jerry and Ergas, Henry and Farber, David J. and Faulhaber, Gerald R. and Hahn, Robert W. and Kahn, Alfred E. and Leighton, Wayne A. and Litan, Robert E. and Robinson, Glen O. and Singer, Hal J. and Smith, Vernon L. and Taylor, William E. and Tardiff, Timothy J. and Waverman, Leonard and Weisman, Dennis, Net Neutrality Regulation: The Economic Evidence (April 12, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1587058 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1587058

Jerry Brito

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3301 N. Fairfax Dr.
Ste. 450
Arlington, VA 22201-4433
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.mercatus.org

Martin E. Cave

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School ( email )

Centre for Management under Regulation (CMuR)
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

Brunel University London

Kingston Lane
Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH
United Kingdom

Robert Crandall

Brookings Institution ( email )

1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20036-2188
United States
202-797-6291 (Phone)
202-797-6181 (Fax)

AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies

1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Larry F. Darby

The American Consumer Institute ( email )

1701 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20006
United States

Everett Ehrlich

ESC Company ( email )

Washington, DC
United States

Jeffrey A. Eisenach (Contact Author)

American Enterprise Institute ( email )

1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States

NERA Economic Consulting

1255 23rd Street, NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20037
United States
202-466-3510 (Phone)
202-466-3605 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.nera.com

Jerry Ellig

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd
4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201-4433
United States
703-375-9410 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://mercatus.org/jerry-ellig

Henry Ergas

University of Wollongong - SMART Infrastructure Facility ( email )

Northfields Avenue
Wollongong, New South Wales 2522
Australia

Deloitte Access Economics ( email )

9 Sydney Avenue
Barton
Canberra, Kingston 2600
Australia

David J. Farber

Carnegie Mellon University - School of Computer Science ( email )

5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
United States

Gerald R. Faulhaber

University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School ( email )

Steinberg-Dietrich Hall
Suite 1400
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States
215-898-7860 (Phone)

Robert W. Hahn

University of Oxford, Smith School ( email )

Oxford
United Kingdom

Georgetown University

Georgetown Center for Business and Public Policy
Washington, DC 20057
United States

Alfred E. Kahn

National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) (Deceased)

N/A

Wayne A. Leighton

Francisco Marroquin University ( email )

6 calle final, zona 10
Guatemala City, 01010
Guatemala

Robert E. Litan

Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation ( email )

4801 Rockhill Road
Kansas City, MO 64110
United States

AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies

1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Glen O. Robinson

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
(434) 924-3621 (Phone)

Hal J. Singer

Economists Incorporated ( email )

2121 K Street N.W.
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20037
United States
202-747-3520 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ei.com/viewprofessional.php?id=71

Vernon L. Smith

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

One University Dr.
Orange, CA 92866
United States
714-628-2830 (Phone)

Chapman University School of Law ( email )

One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866-1099
United States

William E. Taylor III

Marsh & McLennan Companies - Cambridge Office ( email )

One Main Street, 5th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-621-2615 (Phone)

Timothy J. Tardiff

Advanced Analytical Consulting Group ( email )

211 Congress Street
Boston, MA 02110
United States

Leonard Waverman

London Business School ( email )

Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom

Dennis Weisman

Kansas State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Manhattan, KS 66502-4001
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,030
Rank
16,068
Abstract Views
7,175