Climate Treaties and Backstop Technologies

29 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2010

Date Written: March 2010

Abstract

In this paper I examine the design of climate treaties when there exist two kinds of technology, a conventional abatement technology with (linearly) increasing marginal costs and a backstop technology (“air capture”) with high but constant marginal costs. I focus on situations in which countries can gain collectively by using both technologies. I show that, under some circumstances, countries will be better off negotiating treaties that are not cost-effective. When countries prefer to negotiate self-enforcing agreements that are cost-effective, the availability of the backstop technology causes cooperation in abatement to increase significantly.

JEL Classification: Q54

Suggested Citation

Barrett, Scott, Climate Treaties and Backstop Technologies (March 2010). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3003, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1587961 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1587961

Scott Barrett (Contact Author)

Columbia University

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
161
Abstract Views
2,278
Rank
332,714
PlumX Metrics