Taxes and Quotas for a Stock Pollutant with Multiplicative Uncertainty
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 15.99
20 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 1999
Date Written: March 4, 1999
Abstract
We compare taxes and quotas when firms and the regulator have asymmetric information about abatement costs. Damages are caused by a stock pollutant. Uncertainty enters multiplicatively, i.e. it affects the slope rather than the intercept of abatement costs. We calibrate the model using cost and damage estimates of greenhouse gases. As with additive uncertainty, taxes dominate quotas. The advantage of taxes is much greater with mulitiplicative, compared to additive uncertainty.
Note: This paper is an extension of an earlier work, "Taxes versus Quotas for a Stock Pollutant". It is available at the following URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=128675
JEL Classification: H21, Q28
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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