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Quantification of Harm in Damages Actions for Antitrust Infringements: Insights from German Cartel Cases

28 Pages Posted: 12 Apr 2010 Last revised: 22 Jan 2013

Hans Wolfgang Friederiszick

E.CA Economics; ESMT European School of Management and Technology

Lars-Hendrik Röller

ESMT European School of Management and Technology; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); WZB Berlin Social Science Center - Competitiveness and Industrial Change

Date Written: March 16, 2010

Abstract

This paper argues that empirical economic analysis in court proceedings is subject to important economic and legal restrictions, culminating in a fundamental trade-off between accuracy and practicality. We draw lessons from two influential German court cases - the paper wholesaler cartel decision of 2007 and the cement cartel decision of 2009. We characterise the trade-offs arguing that they need to be well understood, made transparent, and that decisions on how to proceed in light of these trade-offs have to be taken upfront by the court. In this respect, we believe that the three-step procedure (design, application, and robustness checks) followed by the German court in the cement case is well suited to meet the appropriate legal standard and requirements, both with respect to accuracy and practicality.

Keywords: Antitrust Law, Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices, Quantification of Damages

JEL Classification: L12, L41, K21, K41, C10

Suggested Citation

Friederiszick, Hans Wolfgang and Röller, Lars-Hendrik, Quantification of Harm in Damages Actions for Antitrust Infringements: Insights from German Cartel Cases (March 16, 2010). ESMT Working Paper No. 10-001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1588126

ESMT European School of Management and Technology ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin, 10178
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.esmt.org/hans-w-friederiszick

Lars-Hendrik Röller

ESMT European School of Management and Technology ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin, 10178
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.esmt.org/eng/faculty-research/lars-hendrik-roeller/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

WZB Berlin Social Science Center - Competitiveness and Industrial Change ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
10785 Berlin
Germany
+49 30 2549 1440 (Phone)
+49 30 2549 1442 (Fax)

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