Artificial Agents and the Contracting Problem: A Solution Via an Agency Analysis

University of Illinois Journal of Law Technology & Policy, p. 363, 2009

41 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2010  

Samir Chopra

CUNY Brooklyn College

Laurence White

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: April 13, 2010

Abstract

The increasing use of artificial agents such as bots, automated trading systems, and the like, in e-commerce and financial markets, has sparked a lively doctrinal debate in the legal academy and amongst international legislative bodies about the legal standing of the contracts that such agents might enter into during the course of their activities. In this article, we examine some putative solutions to the “contracting problem” and argue that its most satisfying resolution – along the legal and economic dimensions – lies in granting artificial agents a limited form of legal agency. Such a move is not only prompted by the ever-increasing autonomy and technical sophistication of today’s artificial agents but also by the better liability protection it enables for the human and corporate principals of artificial agents.

Keywords: artificial agents, contracting, e-commerce

JEL Classification: K12

Suggested Citation

Chopra, Samir and White, Laurence, Artificial Agents and the Contracting Problem: A Solution Via an Agency Analysis (April 13, 2010). University of Illinois Journal of Law Technology & Policy, p. 363, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1589564

Samir Chopra (Contact Author)

CUNY Brooklyn College ( email )

2900 Bedford Avenue
Brooklyn, NY 11210
United States

Laurence White

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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